The Letter (H)On 3 March 2006, Adalah sent a letter to the head of the Israel Prison Service (IPS), Yaakov Ganot, and the head of the State Attorney’s Office, Osnat Mandel, demanding the cancellation of a decision preventing Attorney Hanan Khatib, an Arab citizen of Israel, from entering all prisons in Israel, with immediate effect.
Attorney Hanan Khatib works as a defense lawyer for Palestinian political prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons. On 21 February 2006, she received a letter from the authorities at the Sharon prison informing her that she had been prohibited from entering the prison. She received a second letter on 6 March 2006 from the District Prison Commander for the Sharon Section (which includes the Damun, Ashmoret and Ofek Prisons and the Hadarim Detention Center as well as the Sharon Prison), in which he stated that the decision had been made to prevent her from entering all prisons in Israel. The reason given in the letter was that she had made statements to an Arabic language media outlet that a copy of the Qur’an had been torn by one of the Sharon prison wardens. Attorney Khatib then unsuccessfully attempted to explain to the District Prison Commander that her statements were an honest representation of what one of her clients had told her.
In the letter, Adalah Attorney Abeer Baker emphasized that the decision to ban Attorney Khatib from entering Israeli prisons is arbitrary and legally baseless. The way in which the decision was made, the position of the decision-maker and the results arising from the decision all run counter to the instructions of the law, judicial rulings and the constitutional and administrative principles to which the prison authorities are bound to adhere. For instance, the latest amendment to the Prisons Order (1971) authorizes only the head of the IPS and the director of an individual prison to make a decision to ban a lawyer from entering a specific prison, and not a District Prison Commander, as in Attorney Khatib’s case. If such a decision is made by the director of an individual prison, the decision in valid for a period of only 24 hours, and a maximum period of five days if made by the head of the IPS. Further, only a District Court judge has the authority to extend such a ban for longer than five days. In the case of Attorney Khatib, the decision was taken by someone without the appropriate authority and for an unlimited period of time, all in contravention of the Prisons Order.
The Prisons Order stipulates, moreover, that a ban can only be placed on a lawyer preventing him or her from entering a prison where there exists a real and specific fear that the lawyer’s visit to a prison could threaten the security of the state, the public or an individual person, or when the visit could clearly lead to the incidence of dangerous acts of unrest inside the prison. As Adalah stressed in the letter, the events in question in Attorney Khatib’s case are obviously far from being classifiable as among the reasons for banning a lawyer enumerated in the Prisons Order.
Adalah further argued that the decision to prohibit Attorney Khatib from entering Israeli prisons is invalid as it was taken without allowing her to make an appeal against it or to defend herself, and as it breaches the constitutional right of prisoners to legal representation, as well as Attorney Khatib’s constitutional right to freedom of occupation.